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Field note

Ontario Rent Rules, September 21, 2026: Seven Changes Landlords Must Act On

Three separate instruments come into force on the same day: Schedule 12 of Bill 60, O. Reg. 241/26, and Schedule 7 of Bill 97, which has sat unproclaimed since 2023. Most coverage treats it as Bill 60 day and misses half the package, including a presumption of bad faith that shifts the burden onto the landlord.

Last updated August 30, 2026 · Legislation, regulations and effective dates can change; verify current rules before acting.

Short answer: From September 21, 2026, an unpaid-rent notice gives a tenant seven days instead of fourteen, a tenant who wants to raise their own complaints at an arrears hearing has to pay half the arrears first, and a landlord who serves for their own use and then leaves the unit empty is presumed to have acted in bad faith (ss. 59(1), 82(2), 57(6.1)). They come from three pieces of law, not one: Schedule 12 of Bill 60, Schedule 7 of Bill 97, and O. Reg. 241/26. Bill 60’s seven changes mostly help landlords on timing. Bill 97’s three run the other way, tightening what a landlord owes a tenant after a repair or renovation notice. The changeover is not uniform: some rules turn on the date a notice is given, others on the date an application is filed or an order is issued, and that is where notices get lost.

Three instruments, one day

An instrument is just a document that carries legal force: an Act passed by the Legislature, or a regulation made under one. It “comes into force” on the day it starts binding people. Three of them do that on September 21, 2026.

The first is Bill 60, the Fighting Delays, Building Faster Act, 2025, S.O. 2025, c. 14. A bill that size is split into numbered schedules, one per subject, and residential tenancies are Schedule 12. The bill got its final approval, Royal Assent, on November 27, 2025, but Schedule 12 set no start date of its own. It left that to an order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, and the order named September 21, 2026 (s. 15 of that Schedule).

The same order does something less widely reported. Bill 97, the Helping Homebuyers, Protecting Tenants Act, 2023, S.O. 2023, c. 10, passed in 2023, but several provisions in its Schedule 7 were never switched on. They have been law on paper and inert in practice ever since. They come into force on the same day as Schedule 12.

The third is O. Reg. 241/26, a regulation: rules made by Cabinet under an Act, without a further vote in the Legislature. Nobody writes about it, and it is the one that makes four of Bill 60’s changes work at all. Several of the amended sections say only that a test is to be worked out “in accordance with the regulations”, or that prescribed circumstances, meaning circumstances a regulation sets out, must be satisfied. Without this regulation they are hooks with nothing hanging on them. It amends O. Reg. 516/06 (General), adding ss. 8.1 to 8.4 and a new Part II.1 at ss. 17.1 and 17.2.

Coverage calling this “Bill 60 day” is describing roughly half of what happens. If your reading stopped at Bill 60, you have the seven changes below and none of the three that follow them.

The seven Bill 60 changes

These run in order of how much they change day-to-day practice, not by section number. All seven are live on September 21, 2026, and several carry their own rule about which files they reach.

1. A tenant who misses rent gets seven days, not fourteen

Serve an N4 for unpaid rent today and, on the monthly tenancies most landlords hold, the termination date sits at least fourteen days out. From September 21 it is seven, on every tenancy. A tenant who fails to pay rent lawfully owing can be given a notice of termination, the document that sets the date the tenancy ends, “effective not earlier than the 7th day after the notice is given” (s. 59(1)).

The replacement is flatter. The old version had two branches: seven days for a daily or weekly tenancy, and the fourteenth day “in all other cases”, the branch that covered monthly tenancies. The new one has a single number and no branches. The daily and weekly distinction is gone from it entirely, and seven days is the floor on every tenancy (s. 59(1)).

Caution: seven days is half the room you used to have to spot a mistake and serve again. A notice with the wrong arrears figure, the wrong dates or the wrong service method is as vulnerable as it ever was, and a shorter clock is no defence to any of that. A faster notice also does nothing about the hearing queue sitting behind it.

2. Three late payments in six months can now be called persistent

Applying to end a tenancy for persistent late payment has always meant arguing about a word nobody had defined. Now the word gets handed to the regulations: what counts as a persistent failure to pay rent on the date it becomes due and payable “shall be determined in accordance with the regulations, if any”, and a regulation now supplies them (s. 58(1.1); O. Reg. 241/26 s. 2).

The rule says a persistent failure to pay includes circumstances in which a tenant “has failed to pay rent within seven days of the date it becomes due and payable on at least three occasions within any six-month period”, where on each of those occasions the failure to pay was not “solely attributable to the landlord applying a rent payment made during that six-month period to another amount owing by the tenant, including rent arrears” (O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.1(1)).

Two qualifiers matter as much as the number. The first is that carve-out, and the word doing the work in it is solely. An occasion drops out of the count only where the tenant looks late purely because you took their rent payment and applied it to something else they owed. If anything else contributed, it still counts. The second is that the count is not the whole test: a persistent failure “may arise in circumstances not set out in subsection (1)”, and subsection (1) “shall not limit” what may constitute one. Three late payments in six months is a floor, not a ceiling, so a pattern short of the number is still arguable and a pattern that meets it is not the end of the argument (s. 8.1(2)).

Caution: this is a ledger question and nothing else. Three occasions, inside one six-month window, each more than seven days late, each traceable to the tenant rather than to your own handling of their money. A landlord who cannot produce dated payment records cannot run the test at all.

3. A tenant who wants to talk about the state of the unit has to pay first

Today a tenant facing an arrears hearing can raise their own complaints in the same room: maintenance, harassment, anything they could have filed as their own application. From September 21 that costs money, paid before anyone sits down.

The tenant has to pay “half of any rent arrears that were claimed in the application when it was filed”, plus “such other amounts as may be prescribed”, and it has to be paid at least seven days before the hearing (s. 82(1) and (2), paras. 4 and 5; O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.3).

The half is measured on the arrears as claimed in the application on the day it was filed, not on whatever has piled up by the hearing date. On a file that has waited months, the governing number is the smaller, older one.

What the section asks for today is notice and nothing else: the tenant tells the landlord in advance that they intend to raise the issue, within the time set by the Board’s Rules, in writing and complying with those Rules. No payment of any kind, which is why raising a cross-issue currently costs a tenant nothing. The money is being added to a list that has only ever asked for notice (s. 82(2)).

There is a second change, and it is the part the half-arrears headline hides. Today a tenant who cannot meet those requirements has another way in: giving “an explanation satisfactory to the Board explaining why the tenant could not comply with the requirements set out in subsection (2).” That route is being deleted. After September 21 a tenant who misses the notice or the payment has nothing left inside the section. It is the largest change to hearing dynamics in the package, and the one most likely to blindside a tenant who arrives ready to argue about the state of the unit (s. 82(1)).

Caution: which version applies to a given file turns on when the application was made, not on when the hearing is held. Check that filing date before you assume a tenant owes anything (s. 82(4) and (5)).

4. A tenant asking for more time before the sheriff comes has a harder case

When the Board orders an eviction, a tenant can ask it to hold off on enforcement: the standard relief-from-eviction request. Until now nothing was prescribed, and the Board weighed whatever it found persuasive. From September 21 it is a fixed structure: the Board may postpone only if the landlord consents, or if one of two prescribed conditions is met (s. 83(1)(b); O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.4, added by O. Reg. 241/26 s. 5).

Which condition depends on the eviction. Where it rests on a notice given for the landlord’s own use, a purchaser’s own use, or repairs and renovations, the Board only has to be satisfied that postponing “would not be unfair to the landlord or other tenants of the residential complex.” On any other application it has to be satisfied of that and that “there are compelling grounds to postpone the enforcement of the eviction order” (ss. 48, 49 and 50).

Caution: nothing in the Act or the regulation says what “compelling grounds” means. Board decisions over the coming year will build its content, and until a body of them exists neither side can say with confidence where the line sits. Treat any firm statement about what clears that bar as a prediction.

5. You can drop the month’s rent on an own-use notice, but not on a sale

A notice ending a tenancy for the landlord’s own use costs a month’s rent, or another rental unit the tenant finds acceptable. From September 21 you can drop that, but only where all three conditions hold. You give the notice on or after the day the waiver comes into force, September 21. The termination date in it is at least 120 days after you give it. And that date is “the day a period of the tenancy ends or, where the tenancy is for a fixed term, the end of the term.” Miss the period boundary by a day and you owe the month, however much notice you gave (s. 48.1(1) and (2); Sch. 12, s. 2(2) of the Fighting Delays, Building Faster Act, 2025).

The correction that matters is how far the waiver reaches. It covers a notice served for your own use, or for one of the people the Act lists alongside you. A sale where the buyer wants to move in is a different section, and its compensation sits in a separate provision Bill 60 does not touch, so a purchaser’s-own-use notice still carries the month’s rent with no 120-day waiver. Repairs and renovations are a third section again. One form, the N12, covers all of those grounds, and the waiver reaches only the own-use branch, so calling this the end of N12 compensation does not match what the sections say (own use, s. 48 and s. 48(1); purchaser’s own use, s. 49, with compensation at s. 49.1; repairs and renovations, s. 50).

Caution: the good-faith requirement on an own-use notice is untouched. A notice served for a stated purpose that is not the real one is as actionable after the in-force date as it was before it, and the bad-faith presumption discussed below leaves a pretextual own-use notice more exposed, not less. The waiver saves a month of rent. It buys no latitude at all on why you served (ss. 48, 57(6.1)).

6. The fifteen days to challenge an order is not new, whatever you have read

If a Board order goes against you, you can ask the Board to review it, and you have fifteen days. That has been true since July 1, 2026, when the Board cut the window from thirty days to fifteen under its own Rule of Practice 26. Coverage presenting the fifteen days as a Bill 60 change is describing something that already happened. The LTB’s Request to Review an Order instructions have said since then that a request about an order issued on or after July 1, 2026 “must be made no later than 15 days after the date the order was issued”, and that one about an order issued before that date must be made “no later than 30 days after the date the order was issued.”

What Bill 60 does is put the same number into the Act. A request to review all or part of a decision or order “shall be submitted within 15 days of the issuance of the decision or order, unless the Board considers it just and appropriate in the circumstances to extend the time to request the review.” So what changes on September 21 is where the rule lives, plus a statutory power to extend, not the count of days. The extension is discretionary, and it is not a plan (s. 209(3)).

The reach is narrow. The statutory version applies only to a decision or order made on or after the in-force date, so it does not touch an order made before that day (s. 209(3) and (4)).

Caution: the fifteen days run from the day the order was issued, not the day it reaches you, and mail or portal delay comes out of your half of the clock. Calendar the deadline the day the order arrives.

7. If a tenant breaks a payment deal, they get one fewer way out

When a tenant agrees to end the tenancy, or gives notice and then stays, a landlord can get an eviction order without a hearing: an ex parte order, meaning one made with only one side present. The tenant can still ask the Board to cancel that order (s. 77(6); the two grounds for the order itself are s. 77(1)(a) and (b)).

The window is short, and using it has an immediate effect. The tenant has ten days from the day the order is issued to file the motion, and the moment the Board receives it the order is stayed: it cannot be enforced, under the Act or through the Superior Court, while the stay is on. If you are holding an ex parte order, those ten days are the period in which the file can still turn (s. 77(6) and (7)).

Until now the Board weighed whatever it thought relevant. From September 21 there is a set test. The Board must “make an order setting aside the order under subsection (4), if the prescribed circumstances, conditions or tests have been satisfied”, and the regulation spells those out: set the order aside where, having regard to all the circumstances other than the excluded ones, it is satisfied “that it would not be unfair to do so” (s. 77(8)(b); O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.2, added by O. Reg. 241/26 s. 3).

The exclusion is the operative part. One thing is ruled out: anything that went wrong in the tenant’s life after they signed. The Board shall not consider changes in the circumstances of the tenant that arose after the agreement was entered into, or after the tenant gave the notice. A job lost in October cannot reopen a deal signed in August, and neither can a medical event. The facts are frozen at the date of the agreement or the notice, which closes off a common set-aside argument and makes the date on a mediated agreement matter more than it used to (s. 77(1)(a) and (b)).

Caution: the freeze cuts both ways. Everything up to the date of the agreement or the notice remains in play, and the Board must still be satisfied that setting the order aside “would not be unfair to do so.” The regulation narrows the material a tenant can draw on. It does not make a set-aside unlikely, and it is not a reason to treat an ex parte order as settled (s. 8.2).

Two more items in Schedule 12 change paperwork rather than outcomes. The first is the form you serve on: a notice of termination has to be on a form the Board has approved, unless a regulation prescribes the form, in which case you use that one. If you serve from an old template saved on your computer, that is the change to watch. The second carries the same package across to non-profit housing co-operatives, backed by a new Part II.1 in the regulation. If you sit on a co-op board rather than hold a rent roll, that is your version of the seven above (s. 43(1); ss. 94.2(2.1), 94.10(8)(b) and 94.12(1)(b); O. Reg. 516/06 ss. 17.1 and 17.2).

Also on September 21, from a different bill

The three rules below were passed in 2023 and then left switched off. They have sat in Schedule 7 of Bill 97 ever since, and they start working on the same day as Schedule 12. They point the other way from Bill 60, and most landlord-facing coverage of September 21 skips all three. This is the half of the day that costs you.

You owe the tenant three letters during a renovation, and 60 days at the end of it

A tenant who moves out so the unit can be repaired or renovated can ask to move back in when the work is done. That is the right of first refusal. Three letters now attach to it, each owed “without delay”. Tell the tenant in writing “the estimated date by which the rental unit is expected to be ready for occupancy following the repairs or renovations”. If that estimate moves, tell them “the new estimated date” as soon as you know. And once the unit is ready, tell them it is ready (s. 53 and s. 53(2.1)).

Then the tenant gets time to decide. You “shall give the tenant at least 60 days after the day the rental unit is ready for occupancy to exercise the right of first refusal”. Those 60 days run from the day the unit was ready, not from the day the third letter went out, so sending it late does not shorten the tenant’s window. It breaks the rule in the next item instead (s. 53(2.2)).

Caution: nothing in the section says how many days “without delay” is, so there is no deadline to put in a calendar. What you can do is keep the dates: when you formed the estimate, when it changed, when the unit was ready, and when each of the three letters went out.

Miss one of those letters and the law treats it as if you had refused the tenant the unit

Miss one of those letters and the law does not weigh it as a paperwork slip against everything you did right. It counts as the thing itself. “A landlord who fails to comply with the requirements of subsection 53 (2.1) or (2.2) is deemed, for the purposes of subsection (1) only, to have failed to afford a former tenant a right of first refusal.” Deemed means the law simply treats it that way, so a missed letter becomes a failure to give the tenant their unit back (s. 57.1(1) and (1.1)).

There is a deadline on the tenant’s side too, and it was rewritten at the same time. No application may be made “after the later of the following days: 1. The second anniversary of the day the former tenant vacated the rental unit. 2. The day that is six months after the day the repairs or renovations are completed” (s. 57.1(2)).

Those two compound. A missed letter becomes a deemed failure to afford the right of first refusal, and the clock on it no longer runs only from the day the tenant moved out. On a renovation that drags on, or stops and restarts, the second date governs, and it does not start until the work is finished.

Caution: it is the later of the two days, not the earlier. A file that looks closed because the tenant left more than two years ago is not closed if the work was completed within the last six months.

Serve for your own use, leave the unit empty, and you start out in the wrong

Serve for your own use and then leave the unit empty, and the question of who has to prove what flips. Where “no person referred to in clause 48 (1) (a), (b), (c) or (d) occupied the rental unit within the prescribed period of time after the former tenant vacated the rental unit, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proven on a balance of probabilities, that, (a) the landlord gave the notice of termination under section 48 in bad faith; and (b) the rental unit was not occupied within a reasonable time after the former tenant vacated the rental unit” (s. 57(6.1)).

That is a reversal. Normally the former tenant has to build the bad-faith case; here, once the condition is met, bad faith is taken as established and the landlord has to displace it on a balance of probabilities. A landlord who serves for their own use and leaves the unit sitting empty is no longer answering the tenant’s evidence. They are answering their own empty unit.

One point on that provision needs stating precisely, because it is easy to state carelessly. The presumption is measured against a “prescribed period of time”, meaning a length of time set out in a regulation. As of the current consolidation of O. Reg. 516/06, checked on August 30, 2026, no period is prescribed for s. 57(6.1), and nothing in that consolidation prescribes one. A presumption measured against a prescribed period has nothing to measure against until a period is prescribed.

That is a description of the instruments as they read today, and it is not a plan. A regulation can be amended at any time, and O. Reg. 241/26 in this same package is an example of that. Treat the gap as something to be filled rather than something to build around, and do not assume what the length of the period will be when it arrives.

Caution: the presumption turns on whether one of the people the Act lists moved in, and on when. That is a question of evidence, and the landlord is the one who will be answering it, so who moved in, on what date, and how they are related to you are worth writing down while it is happening rather than reconstructing a year later (the list is at s. 48(1)(a) to (d)).

What to do before September 21, and after

This package does not flip over cleanly on the day. Each change carries its own rule about which files it reaches, and those rules do not all point at the same date, so a landlord can hold one file on the old rules and another on the new ones on the same afternoon. The question is never what today’s date is. It is which date decides that file.

  1. The N12 compensation waiver: the day you gave the notice. The waiver reaches a notice “given on or after the day subsection 2 (2) of Schedule 12 to the Fighting Delays, Building Faster Act, 2025 comes into force”, which is September 21, and only where its other two conditions are met as well (s. 48.1(2)).
  2. The half-arrears requirement: the day the application was filed. The old rules stay alive for an application “that was made before that day and has not been finally determined before that day, even if the hearing of the application is on or after that day.” If your application is already filed, you stay on the old section even when the hearing lands in October (s. 82(1), (2), (4) and (5)).
  3. The fifteen days in the Act: the day the order was made. The statutory version reaches only a decision or order made on or after the in-force date, so an order made before that day is not touched by it (s. 209(3) and (4)).
  4. The set-aside test and the postponement conditions: the day the regulation starts. The tests in both come from the regulation, and Schedule 12 gives them no changeover rule of their own, so they apply from the day it is in force (O. Reg. 516/06 ss. 8.2 and 8.4, added by O. Reg. 241/26).

In practice. An N4 given on September 20 was given while the old rule was still the law, so it runs on the old notice period. An application filed on September 19 stays on the old section, and a tenant raising their own complaints at that hearing pays nothing to raise them. An order made on September 22 falls under the statutory fifteen days and the extension test that comes with it, while an order made on September 19 is left to the Board’s Rule 26, which has set the same fifteen days since July 1, 2026. One week, and a different regime on file after file (ss. 59(1), 82, 209(3)).

Underneath all of it sits the form rule. A notice of termination “shall be in a form approved by the Board, unless the form of the notice is prescribed in which case the notice shall be in the prescribed form”, so expect the approved forms to be reissued around the in-force date. Serving last year’s N4 or N12 is the easiest way to lose a file here: the notice period, the arrears figure and the reason can all be right, and the form still sinks it (s. 43(1)).

Caution: the dates that decide these questions are in your own records, not in the legislation. Pull the filing date on every open application, the date every order you may still want reviewed was made, and the service date on every notice already out the door, and sort them against September 21 before that week arrives.

Why records decide these cases now

One thread runs through all of it. Several of these changes swap a judgment call for a fixed test, and a test is answered with documents rather than argument. That pushes these files toward whichever side kept a record, and away from whoever tells the better story on the day.

Persistent late payment is the clearest case. The test is arithmetic done on a ledger: three occasions, inside one six-month window, each payment more than seven days late, and each failure not solely down to the landlord applying a rent payment to another amount owing. Every input is a date. A landlord without a clean payment record cannot run it at all. A tenant with one can take occasions back out of the count by showing a payment that landed on day six, or a payment the landlord moved across to an older balance. The same tenancy, argued from two ledgers, gives two totals, and the Board works from the documented one. That record starts before the tenancy does, which is why lawful tenant screening and an orderly rent ledger are the same discipline at two ends (O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.1(1)).

The bad-faith presumption does something different. It moves the burden, and it moves it onto the landlord. Where nobody on the Act’s list moves into the unit within the prescribed period, bad faith is presumed, and the landlord is the one who has to displace it on a balance of probabilities. The period is the open part: as set out above, no period is prescribed for s. 57(6.1) in the current consolidation of O. Reg. 516/06, checked on August 30, 2026 (the list is at s. 48(1)(a) to (d)).

That changes what a defence is made of. Proof of a genuine intention when the notice was served, and proof of who actually moved in afterwards and on what date, stops being helpful support and becomes the defence itself. From the other side, a former tenant no longer has to build bad faith out of inference: the case needs proof of what happened to the unit, which is an occupancy question, answerable by observation and records. That is the ground a bad-faith eviction file is fought on now, and landlords under a municipal renoviction bylaw have already met the paperwork version of it on the renovation side.

The two new prescribed standards close the loop. “Compelling grounds” and “it would not be unfair to do so” are standards of evidence, and each tells the parties what a case has to be built out of. One tells the Board what it may not look at, so a tenant seeking a set-aside has to assemble the case out of what existed on or before the date of the agreement or the notice. The other lets the Board postpone an eviction only where the landlord consents or the prescribed conditions are met: in every case, that postponing would not be unfair to the landlord or the other tenants in the complex, and, on an application not resting on an own-use, purchaser’s-own-use or renovation notice, that there are compelling grounds as well. Neither can be argued now as a general appeal to circumstances. Both sides argue to a test, and a test is answered with material (set-aside, O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.2; postponement, s. 8.4; the three notice types, ss. 48, 49 and 50).

Our own landlord and tenant work sits at that end of the problem: occupancy verification, dated observation records, and hearing-ready reporting.

Not legal advice

This article is general information about Ontario’s Residential Tenancies Act and the regulations under it, not legal advice. Effective dates and prescribed tests can change, and how any of them applies turns on the facts of a file; confirm your own situation with a licensed Ontario paralegal or lawyer before serving a notice or filing.

Frequently asked questions

When do the new Ontario rent rules take effect?

September 21, 2026. Three instruments come into force that day: Schedule 12 of Bill 60, the Fighting Delays, Building Faster Act, 2025, which left its start date to an order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council (s. 15 of that Schedule); Schedule 7 of Bill 97, the Helping Homebuyers, Protecting Tenants Act, 2023, passed in 2023 and switched off until now; and O. Reg. 241/26, which amends O. Reg. 516/06.

It is not a clean switch-over. Different provisions point at different dates: the day a notice was given, the day an application was filed, or the day a decision or order was made. Which set of rules governs a file depends on the event its provision points at, not on the calendar.

Does the 7-day N4 apply to a notice I served before September 21?

No. Schedule 12 sets no changeover rule for the notice period, so the answer follows from the start date alone. A notice given before September 21, 2026 was given while the current rule was still law, and it runs on the period that rule sets. The new version, under which a notice for unpaid rent may be effective “not earlier than the 7th day after the notice is given”, applies to notices given on or after that day (s. 59(1)).

A shorter clock does not fix a bad notice. An N4 with the wrong arrears figure, the wrong dates or the wrong service method fails on those grounds whether it runs seven days or fourteen.

Can I skip the N12 compensation if I’m selling and the buyer wants to move in?

No. The waiver reaches only a notice served for the landlord’s own use, or for one of the people the Act lists alongside them. A buyer moving in runs through a different section, and its compensation sits in a separate provision Bill 60 does not amend. A purchaser’s-own-use notice still costs one month’s rent, or another rental unit the tenant finds acceptable, with no 120-day waiver (waiver, s. 48.1(2); own use, s. 48 and s. 48(1); purchaser’s own use, s. 49, with compensation at s. 49.1).

Where the notice really is an own-use notice, the waiver applies only if all three criteria hold: the notice is given on or after September 21, 2026; the termination date is at least 120 days after the notice is given; and that date is the day a period of the tenancy ends or, on a fixed term, the end of the term (s. 48.1(2)).

What counts as persistent late payment now?

The question goes to the regulations, and a regulation now answers it. A persistent failure to pay includes a tenant failing to pay rent within seven days of the date it becomes due and payable on at least three occasions inside any six-month period, where on each of those occasions the failure was not solely because the landlord took a rent payment made in that period and applied it to another amount the tenant owed (s. 58(1.1); O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.1(1)).

That is a floor and not a definition. A persistent failure “may arise in circumstances not set out in subsection (1)”, and subsection (1) “shall not limit” what may constitute one. A pattern that falls short of three occasions can still be argued, and a pattern that meets the count is still open to the tenant’s answer (s. 8.1(2)).

Can a tenant still raise maintenance issues at an arrears hearing?

Yes, but it costs something now. A tenant can still raise anything at a landlord’s arrears hearing that they could have filed as their own application. From September 21, 2026 they also have to pay half of any rent arrears claimed in the application when it was filed, plus any prescribed amounts, on top of the written-notice requirements already there, and it is due no later than seven days before the hearing (s. 82 and s. 82(2); O. Reg. 516/06 s. 8.3).

Two further points. The clause that let a tenant who could not comply give the Board a satisfactory explanation instead is being deleted, so meeting those requirements is the only way in. And the changeover points at the day the application was made, so an application filed before September 21 stays on the current section even where the hearing is held later (s. 82(1), (4) and (5)).

Did Bill 60 cut the LTB review window from 30 days to 15?

No, and this is the most common error in coverage of September 21. The Board itself moved the review window from thirty days to fifteen on July 1, 2026, under its own Rule of Practice 26. Its Request to Review an Order instructions state that a request about an order issued on or after July 1, 2026 must be made no later than 15 days after the date the order was issued, and that a request about an order issued before that date must be made no later than 30 days.

What Bill 60 does on September 21 is put the same fifteen days into the Act. A review request has to be submitted within 15 days of the issuance of the decision or order “unless the Board considers it just and appropriate in the circumstances to extend the time to request the review”, and the statutory version reaches only a decision or order made on or after the in-force date. What changes is where the rule comes from, plus the statutory power to extend, not the count of days (s. 209(3) and (4)).

Sources

  1. Ontario, Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, ss. 43(1), 48.1(1)–(2), 49.1, 53(2.1)–(2.2), 57(6.1), 57.1(1.1)–(2), 58(1.1), 59(1), 77(8)(b), 82, 83(1)(b), 209(2)–(4). Accessed August 30, 2026.
  2. Ontario, O. Reg. 516/06 (General), ss. 8.1–8.4 and Part II.1, as amended by O. Reg. 241/26. Accessed August 30, 2026.
  3. Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Bill 60, Fighting Delays, Building Faster Act, 2025, Schedule 12. S.O. 2025, c. 14. Royal Assent November 27, 2025. Accessed August 30, 2026.
  4. Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Bill 97, Helping Homebuyers, Protecting Tenants Act, 2023, Schedule 7. S.O. 2023, c. 10. Accessed August 30, 2026.
  5. Tribunals Ontario, Landlord and Tenant Board, Request to Review an Order: form instructions, Section B (15 days for an order issued on or after July 1, 2026; 30 days for one issued before that date). Accessed August 30, 2026.
  6. Tribunals Ontario, LTB Operational Update: Legislative Changes at the LTB, June 30, 2026, listing the changes effective July 1, 2026. Accessed August 30, 2026.

End of field note

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